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certification issues in the opioid MDL,
and the duo drafted a lawy review
article explaining the new idea [The

Negotiation Class: A Cooperative
Approach to Class Actions Involving
Large Stakeholders, 99 TEx. I.. Rv.
(forthcoming 2020)]. Apparently convinced of the approach's utility and
doctrinal soundness, the opioid MDL
plaintiffs' leadership team moved for
certification of a negotiation class
in the summer of 2019. After highly
adversarial proceedings, Judge Dan A.
Polster of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio gave the
green light in a 40-page slip opinion,
In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig. At
press time, the viability of the iegotiation class was petding heore the Sixth
Circuit on interlocutory appeal.
ELIZABETH BURGH, a tniversity of
Georgia lae profess
and author of

M/lass Trt Deals: Bachroon Bargaining
in Multidistrict Litigation (Cambridge
University Press, 2019), discussed the
implications of the negotiation class
with McGovern and Rubenstein in early
2020, just weeks before McGovern's
unexpected death on Feb. 14. (See a
tribute to him on page 8.) Their conver-

sation follows - and helps to illustrate
how much we've lost with McGovern's
untimely passing.

- Editors

BURCH: How did you come up with
this idea for the negotiation class, and

how does it work?
MCGOVERN: The genesis was a
phone call from some lawyers in the

opioid MDL who were wondering how
they could participate in sorne type
of overall settlement, even i to l

they were not part of the Plaintiffs
Executive Comrnittee. There are
roughly 30,000 cities and counties that
would potentially be involved in settenient, so the question was, "H ow do
you put together a group of folks who
could facilitate their bargaining power
and still provide defendants the kind of
closure they are looking for in the settetent of a case?"
Under the negotiation class approach,
the plaintiffs agree in advance - prior
to any negotiation - how they would
divide up the money, and they agree to
be bound by a supermajority vote.
RUBENSTEIN: Traditionally, there are
two types of class actiuns. The first is
tle conventional "trial class action"
where Von0 rtyifv a class and enable
people to opt out up front and then
go ahead and try the case. Whoever

-

the court's export consultant

doesn't opt out is bound to the outcome
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of the case. The second is a "settlement class action" - where the case
is not certified first; the parties settle
the case and then simultaneously seek
judicial approval of the settlement and
class certification.
What's new about this "negotiation

class" idea is that it works like an amalgam of those two. As in the trial class
action, we certify the class up front;
but as in the settlement class action, we

even had to face a heightened review
of the adequacy of class representatives if they'd already settled the case.
And we never imagined deviating from
that. So we have proposed that all the
class certification requirements would
have to be met for the negotiation class
to go forward. And as it was applied in
the opioid case, Judge Polster's opinion carefully worked through all of
the class certification requirements,

only do so for the purposes of negotiat-

which were hotly contested by the

ing a settlement. What Francis came up
with is: "We can't tell you exactly how
much you're going to get. But we can
tell you what percentage of the settlement you'll get. And we can safeguard
your rights by making sure when a settlement is finally achieved every class

adversaries in the case. [See In re Nat'l

member will get to vote on the settle-

ment." It really is a kind of ingenious
idea that puts together a lot of pieces
that both enable settlements in certain
types of situations and simultaneously protect the rights of absent class

members.
BURCH: To certify a class under the

"negotiation class" proposal, is it
enough that plaintiffs would be seeking a common issue of process - that
is, to establish a procedural mechanism that provides a voting process as
to settlement considerations - or must
plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23's standards
by identifying a common question of
conduct or liability that exists independent of class certification?
RUBENSTEIN:

From

a

doctrinal

perspective, we were both very mindful that, in Amchem Products, Inc.

v. Windsor [521 U.S. 591 (1997)], the
Supreme Court ruled that a class proposed for settlement purposes still had
to meet all of the requirements of class
certification (except the manageability requirement). The proposed class

PrescriptionOpiateLitig., 332 F.R.D. 532
(N.D. Ohio 2019).]
The Court also said in Amchem that
we should be careful about the adequacy of class representatives in these
circumstances. Indeed, one of the
improvements in the negotiation class
certification is that the court is scrutinizing who is representing the class
prior to the settlement negotiations.
And unlike a settlement class action,
where you just get the deal put on the
table at the end, here the court examines up front whether the deal will
be fair to everyone in the class, and
whether the class is adequately represented. So from a doctrinal point of

everyone's saying how great it is. And
therefore the judge might not get the
kind of information she would in an
adversarial-type proceeding. (Though,
just as a footnote, it so happened in the
opioid case that there was significant
opposition to the negotiation class, so
Judge Polster received a lot of information for and against the idea.)
However, notice two things about
our proposal that I think are better than
a settlement class action - or at least
different. One, the court will get more
information up front because there's
an opt-out period. There's some oppor-

tunity for the class members either to
say to the court, "We got notice of this

and we don't like it. It doesn't smell
right." Two, because the distributional
mechanism has to be worked out up
front, the court will be able to ensure
that the settlement's apportionment

is fair to all the class members before
their counsel begin negotiating a settlement for them.

In the opioid case, Judge Polster
didn't wait until settlement time to
look at the proposed apportionment.

Instead, he appointed a neutral special
master to write a report on whether

view, I think this is actually an improvement on the settlement class action.

the settlement apportionment seemed

BURCH: Are judges at a disadvantage in terms of assessing conflicts of
interest at this early stage? If defen-

BURCH:

dants are the primary means forcing

information out of the plaintiffs that
might bring to light structural conflicts of interests, might plaintiffs be
less likely to produce that information on the front end?
RUBENSTEIN: One concern of both
settlement class actions and negotiation class actions is that both the
plaintiffs and defendants, jointly, are
proposing something to the judge and

fair to all the class members up front.
What sort of gamesman-

ship might judges expect to occur (and
correspondingly, seek to thwart or
exploit) under a negotiation class?
MCGOVERN:

The inventiveness of

lawyers, I think, has very little limits. As a result, it would be extremely
hubristic of us to project that there
couldn't be gaming associated with any
kind of new procedural device. So far,
when we've looked at this within the
context of the opioid case, we haven't
seen gamesmanship as much on the
plaintiffs' side of the coin as we have
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seen on the defendants' side of the
coin. It remains to be seen if that will be
the case in other contexts.
We certainly need to think about the
limits of this type of approach. I feel
very comfortable about its use in the
context of the opioid case. But I'm sure,
if given the time, I could think of some
abuses that might occur in other situations. And that's why I think having the
judge play such an important role at the
beginning of the negotiations is so critical. It allows the judge to be confident
that any gaming is within the bounds
of acceptability. So, sure, the negotiation class approach could be gamed. But
I think there are some safeguards there
that would, in the hands of a good judge,
prevent any unacceptable gaming.
RUBENSTEIN:

We see this pro-

posal working in a particular type of
collective action situation - one like

the opioid case, for instance, where
you have some members with enormous stakes in the controversy and
other members with smaller stakes.
Usually, you would worry whether, in
an aggregate settlement, those with
the largest stake will have an inordinate role and apportion too much of
the money towards themselves. We
don't want them to have a disproportionate impact, but you do want them
to stay in the class so that there can be
an aggregate settlement.
Fortunately, you have two countervailing aspects to this potential
problem, at least in the opioid case.
First, the class members with smaller
value

claims

outnumber the

class

members with significant dollar claims,
so on a "one class member-one vote
basis," the full class can outvote the
larger stakeholders; this ensures that
any distribution plan cannot favor the
large stakeholders too much. Second,
the court has to look at the distribu-

ONE OF THE IMPROVEMENT SINTHE
N
EGOTIATION CLASS CERTIFICAT ION
IS THAT THE COURT IS
SCRUTINIZING
WHO ISREPRESENTING THE CLASS
PRIOR

NEGOTI TION

TO

THE SETTLEME

tional plan upfront. Here, public health
experts developed the mechanism for
dividing up the money, and it is based
purely on the opioid epidemic's effect

on each county or city. And to me,
examining the legitimacy of the allocation tool is key.

lic goods by unearthing information
and making it available to all regulators, and allowing litigants and the
public to participate in trials. Is that
correct? If so, should the negotiation
class be used only in a narrow class
of cases in which compensation is the
predominant or sole priority? Or are

MCGOVERN: The normal negotiation process in mass claims cases often

there ways to accommodate competing
ends, say, among attorneys general?

results in the empowerment of certain

subgroups more than others. Certainly,
much ink has been spilled on the kinds
of outcomes that can occur because of
such unequal bargaining power. But the
concept of the negotiation class is that
the bargaining power is collective. In

the opioid litigation, we haven't seen
opt-outs from the larger entities that
would traditionally have more bargaining power in any kind of negotiation
associated with cities and counties. That
leveling effect, in terms of bargaining

MCGOVERN: The practicalities of
the situation would determine the
answer. If the competing goals are
sufficiently strident, then I doubt you
would have a successful negotiation
class. The only way this approach can
be successful, almost by definition,
is by avoiding a large number of optouts. Implicit in choosing not to opt

power, is quite astonishing to me.

out is an agreement with some of the
fundamental goals of the litigation, the
allocation of the money, and the decision making via supermajority vote.

BURCH: The article seems to prior-

RUBENSTEIN:

itize compensation and finality over
other (perhaps competing) litigation
aims such as deterring wrongdoers,
empowering victims, generating pub-

example, it's fair to say that the class

In the opioid case, for

members have expressed different
ideas about what the litigation is about.
But the opt-outs represent just over
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idea is going to be best in a particular
type of situation, where you have the
risk of large class members defecting

and, relatedly, the risk of being unable
to put together a deal that the defendants will agree to. In that context,
you are dealing with a negotiation of a
monetary settlement that has the usual
attendant risks of opt-out, hold-out,
etc. A primary goal of the negotiation
class is to encourage the class members
to cooperate with one another, speak
to one another, and interact with one
another. So it's possible for plaintiffs to
discuss having different goals, or different ideas, or different thoughts about
what to do, and - instead of going off
in different directions - come up with
a collective solution. That would give
them an enormous amount of leverage
against the defendant.
BURCH: At what point during the
litigation process should parties
anticipate certifying a negotiation
class?
MCGOVERN: That would depend.
There is always a risk that you could
create a negotiation class prematurely,
which might result in an outcome that
would not be as beneficial to the members of the class as it would be if you
waited until you got more information. But there are a couple of barriers
to that happening. One, of course, is
the court. Another is the individual
members of the class who decide that
they need more information before
they feel comfortable with a negoti-

Q"t
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DISCUSS HAVINB DIFFE RENT GOALS,
OR DIFFE RENT IDEAS,OR DIFFERENT

THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT TO DO, AND
INSTEAD OF GOING OFF INDIFFERENT

-

10 percent of the U.S. population. So it
appears, at least in this circumstance,
that notwithstanding disparate goals
among the class members, the mechanism appears to have achieved quite
a broad consensus of entities to be
involved in it.
But structurally, we tend to think this

DIRECT IONS -

COME

UP WITH A

COLECIV SOUIN.
ated amount, and their counsel. And
another is the class action counsel representing the class. So the risk is there,
but there are safeguards as well.
BURCH: What sort of guardrails, limits, or barriers would you impose on
the use of the negotiation class going
forward?
MCGOVERN: Bill actually raised
what I worry about the most: Might
the negotiation class entity be too
powerful? We know from game theory and various literature that working
together in groups tends to be superior to working individually. And so a
judge may need to make sure that, in
creating a bargaining entity through
the negotiation class approach, it is
not skewing the negotiation balance
in an unproductive way. But more generally, I think the ultimate answer to
this concern is this: Defendants don't
have to do a deal with the negotiation
class. It's up to them. In fact, I think

some of the opposition to the negotiation class stems from the fact that
there are alternative approaches to
resolving cases that defendants might
prefer. I'll leave it to others to decide
whether those alternative approaches
give defendants more or less bargaining power.
We think the class
RUBENSTEIN:
certification requirements still have
to be met for negotiation class certification. So that's an important first
guardrail. Second, up-front consideration of whether the allocation of
the settlement is equitable is another
guardrail. As Judge Polster has pointed
out, you wouldn't want to start up this

whole process, get a settlement out of
it, have it put to a vote, have the vote
approved, and then have the judge find,
at the end of the day, that the allocation
wasn't equitable. [See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)

(2)(D) (requiring a court reviewing a proposed class action settlement to ensure
that "the proposal treats class members
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equitably relative to each other").I It
would be just a complete waste of time.
Third, the negotiation class requires
judicial approval of who is negotiating
on behalf of this class. From a histori-

of my ideas, it comes out of a concrete
case. Sometimes the ideas work in one

cal perspective, the reason people didn't

context and not in another. And sometimes they don't work at all. So it gives
me some pleasure to even think that
others are discussing this in various

like the settlement class action in the

places around the country.

1970s and the 1980s was that they were

shocked that someone could negotiate
a classwide settlement who hadn't been
approved by a court to do so. So, again,
the negotiation class actually improves
on the guardrails of the settlement
class by reviewing the class representatives' and class counsel's adequacy prior
to a negotiation. As a final guardrail,
the class itself gets to vote on the outcome - which is an attribute we don't
currently have in any form, other than
the negative form of an opt-out. If anything, the way I view this is it actually
adds a lot of bells and whistles to the
current settlement class action practice.
MCGOVERN: It's a topic that deserves

a lot of additional scrutiny. Like most

BURCH: The Sixth Circuit has the
case on interlocutory appeal now.
Any predictions?
MCGOVERN: There are quite a few
judges who view the MDL process as

a crucible for inventiveness. They are
willing to allow for the idea that complex MDL cases sometimes deserve
different kinds of approaches, simply
because they are, to a certain extent,
idiosyncratic. It would not surprise me

to see the Sixth Circuit view the negotiation class in a positive, or, at least,
agnostic way, and await what happens
next.
It's also possible that defendants will
want to use the negotiation class for
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the assurance of being able to bargain
with a coherent group, and then use a
different, more conventional device for
resolution. So there may be some value

in the establishment of a bargaining
entity, even if it is not used as fully contemplated. For that reason, you might
see a greater willingness to experiment. One of the problems, always,
with any type of novel idea, is the time
lag between the invention and ultimate
judicial scrutiny.

RUBENSTEIN: I guess only time will
tell. I think we all agree it's going to be
interesting -- both in terms of what
the courts say about our new proposal
and, more importantly, in terms of
what happens in attempting to gener-

ate a meaningful settlement in the case.
Ultimately, all of our procedural efforts
are just an attempt to help bring a little
bit of justice in the world. And there are

a lot of important aspects of the case
that I think we all hope will get ironed
out in a meaningful way soon.
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